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ADOPTION-FAILURE TO GIvE NOTICE TO NATURAL PARENTS--EFMCT ON
CHILD's RIGHT TO INHERIT FROM FOSTER PARENTS.-The plaintiff and his
wife adopted the defendant without giving the requisite statutory notice to
the natural parents. Upon the death of his wife, the plaintiff contestel
the defendant's right to share in her estate on the grounds of the invalidity
of the adoption. The lower court held the defendant entitled to share as
an adopted child. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. In Vo
Mathew's Will, 223 N. W. 434 (Wis. 1929).
In most jurisdictions an adopted child has a statutory right to Inherit
from his foster parent. PECK, ADOPTION LAWS IN THE UNITE STATES
(1925) 21. The heirs of the foster parent generally cannot attack his right
of inheritance on the ground of a "technical" non-compliance with the
statute. Jones v. Leeds, 41 Ind. App. 164, 83 N. E. 526 (1908) (failure of
adopting parents to sign decree); In re Gunn's Estate, 227 Mich. 368, 198
N. W. 983 (1924) (failure of adopted child to sign decree); In ro Howard's
Estate, 125 Okla. 86, 256 Pac. 54 (1926) (failure of natural parent to
give written consent); of. Anderson v. Blakesly, 155 Iowa 430, 136 N. W.
210 (1912) (defective adoption construed as a contract specifically enforce-
able so far as it purports to confer a right of inheritance). But where
there was a failure to give notice of the proceeding to the natural parent
some courts have allowed the heir to divest the child of his inheritance on
the theory that such notice was essential to the jurisdiction of the court
in the adoption proceeding. T'uelove v. Parker, 191 N. C. 430, 132 S. E.
295 (1926); Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842 (1888); Note
(1926) 5 N. C. L. Rnv. 67. Contra: Coleman v. Coleman, 81 Ark. 7, 98 S.
W. 733 (1906); of. Harper v. Lindsay, 162 Ga. 44, 132 S. E. 639 (1926).
On similar reasoning the surviving foster parent has been allowed to con-
test the inheritance, as in the instant case. Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 Ill. 231,
148 N. E. 53 (1925). However, the purpose of requiring notice is to pro-
tect the natural right of the parent to his child. See Lacher v. Venus, 177
Wis. 558, 570, 188 N. W. 613, 617 (1922). And, clearly, the natural parent
may have the decree set aside where he has not been notified of the pro-
ceeding. Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill. 468, 79 N. E. 695 (1906); Chance v.
Pigneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S. W. 640 (1926). But it does not necessarily
follow from this that the heir of the foster parent may rely upon the same
defect to contest the child's right to inherit. See Appeal of Woodward, 81
Conn. 152, 166, 70 Atl. 453, 459 (1908). And inasmuch as the natural
parent has raised no objection, it would seem that the failure to give notice
should have no effecti as between the foster parent and the adopted child.
Cf. VAN FLEET, COLLATERAL ATTACK (1892) § 408.
BANKRUPTcY-CoIPENSATION TO ATTORNEYS FOR CREDITORS FOR SERV-
ICES TO BANKRUPT ESTATE.-The plaintiff, an attorney for creditors, em-
ployed the defendant attorneys to conduct bankruptcy proceedings against
a debtor. The defendants were subsequently retained as counsel for the
trustees in bankruptcy. The defendants thereafter contracted with the
plaintiff to collaborate under his general supervision in the performance
of services to the trustees and to divide with him the allowances to be
made by the bankruptcy court. Upon refusal by the defendants to pay
over any part of the fees so received, action was brought to recover the
agreed share. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Circuit Court
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of Appeal. Held, on appeal, that the contract was illegal and void. Judg-
ment reversed. Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 49 Sup. Ct. 144 (1929).
Courts have frequently voiced their disapproval of the employment by
a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy of counsel identified with the interests
of the creditors. See In re T. L. Kelley Dry-Goods Co., 102 Fed. 747, 7,19,
(E. D. Wis. 1900). But, when an attorney for creditors has in fact been
so employed, compensation has generally been allowed him to the extent
to which his services have directly inured to the benefit of the estate. In
re Smith, 203 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913). In the district where the in-
stant case arose a court rule specifies that, unless specially authorized by
the court, receivers or trustees shall not retain as their counsel any in-
terested attorney. RULES OF BANxRUPTCY OF THE DISRICT COuNr FOIR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNS 'LVANIA, Rule 5; see (1925) 10 IovA L. BULL.
209, 221. And compensation has been denied to an attorney who was em-
ployed in violation of this rule. In re Robcrtson, 4 F. (2d) 24S (C. C. A.
3d, 1925). The instant court holds that this rule clearly renders the con-
tract under review illegal. But it also holds that, even in the absence of
this rule, the contract is void as contrary to public policy, and that it is
immaterial that the services were beneficial to the estate. But cf. In re
Levinson, 19 F. (2d) 253 (W. D. 'Wash. 1927); 2 CoLIml BA.1nunrCy
(13th ed. 1924) 1354. The decision in the instant case is a step towards
the enforcement of the policy of keeping distinct the representatives of the
interests of the creditors and of the bankrupt estate. It would seem desir-
able to enforce this policy further by denying compensation in all cases for
services rendered to the estate by attorneys for creditors, except where they
have been specially authorized by the court. See Rogers, The Bankrulptcy
Act and Suggested Changes (1925) 2 N. Y. U. L. Rv. 118, 120.
BANKRur---LEASES-RENT ACCELERATION CLAusE.-A two-year lease
of land provided that the bankruptcy of the lessee should terminate the
lease and should thereupon entitle the lessor to damages equal to the rent
for the residue of the term. Within a year the lessee became bankrupt.
The district court disallowed the lessor's claim for accelerated rent as dam-
ages. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. R. C. Taylor Trist
-v. Kothe, 30 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
The rule of the Auditorium case [Central Trust Co. of Ill. v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916) ] that bankruptcy
is sufficient breach of an executory contract which requires the use of capi-
tal to permit a provable claim for damages has been held not to apply to
leases of land. Wells v. 21st St. Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. Oth,
1926); see (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 418. Nor does the bankruptcy of the
lessee terminate the lease. See Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 363 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1905). Neither is subsequently accruing rent a provable claim.
In Te Mlle. Lemaud, 13 F. (2d) 203 (D. Mass. 1926). But if the lease con-
tains a provision for the acceleration of rent, this will be enforced, where
the landlord has not terminoted the lease. Rosenblum v. Ubcr, 256 Fed.
584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919); In Te Pittsburg Drug Co., 164 Fed. 482 (W. D.
Pa. 1908). While a provision that the lessor may re-enter in case of bank-
ruptcy is enforceable, an accompanying provision that he may recover ac-
tual damages is not, since there is no "fixed liability . . absolutely
owing" as required by § 63a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Roth &
Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410
(C. C. A. 1st, 1910). In the instant case, the landlord is permitted both
to re-enter and to prove a claim for future rent. The requirement of a
'"fxed liability . . . absolutely owing" is satisfied since the recoverable
sum is certain and becomes due automatically and not merely at the op-
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tional re-entry of the lessor. It would seem better to allow the lessor to
,prove his actual damages but, as the cases now stand, he can protect him-
self only by the use of provisions such as those in the instant case. The
enforcement of such provisions seems somewhat unfair to the other credi-
tors, though in the instant case the measure of recovery is not so greatly
in excess of actual damages as to render the result objectionable. Quacrc,
however, whether the claim would not be disallowed on the ground that
the stipulation was a penalty if a long term lease were involved. Cf. In rco
Meruwin & Willoughby Co., 206 Fed. 116 (N. D. N. Y. 1913).
BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSIT IN Two NADIES--IESPONSIBILTY OF
BANK FOR PAYMENT TO DEPOSITOR AFTER NOTICE OF OTHER CLAIM.-COm-
plainant and her husband opened a savings account with the defendant
bank, in the name of husband "or" wife, under a deposit agreement that
any part or all was payable to either. The husband withdrew part of the
fund and redeposited it with the bank in his own name. The complainant
notified the bank that the money was hers and requested them not to pay
to the husband. The bank agreed not to pay for a few days. She promised
to send a written notice to the bank that evening and to secure an injunc-
tion at once. Notice was not sent. A few days later the bank allowed the
husband to draw out the money. A few hours after this the bank wag
served with summons in a divorce proceeding brought by complainant
against her husband. Judgment of the trial court holding the bank liable
for the sum 'was affirmed in the Appellate Court. Held, on appeal, that
judgment be reversed. Landretto v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 164 N. E.
836 (Ill. 1929).
The defendant bank being clearly privileged under the deposit agreement
to pay to the husband from the joint account, the issue here is as to the
subsequent payment to the husband from the personal account after plain-
tiff gave notice of her claim. Ordinarily, when a bank pays to a depositor
after another person has claimed the money the bank is held liable to that
person if he can prove ownership of the funds. Brown v. Daugherty, 120
Fed. 526 (D. Mo. 1903); 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §§
342-343. Under this rule the responsibility of the bank would depend on
whether the plaintiff can establish title to the money as against her hus-
band and since the court assumed that the money originally was the prop-
erty of the wife the result might possibly imply that the deposit in the two
name form changed the ownership of the money. The court does not face
this point squarely, however, and there is much confusion among the au-
thorities as to the effect on the "title" of making a deposit in two names
with permission to either to withdraw. COSTIGAN, CASES ON TRUSTS (1925)
299 n.; (1927) Note 48 A. L. R. 189; (1926) 36 YAL. L. J. 138. It would
seem desirable to provide specifically for the problem of "title" by amend-
ment of the Two Name Deposit Act which has been widely adopted.
PATON, DIGEST (1926) § 1809a; cf. Rice v. Bennington Bank, 93 Vt.
493, 108 Atl. 708 (1920) (Uniform Act held to apply only to protection of
bank, and not to title). The decision might be supported on the theory
adopted by a few courts that a bank which pays to a depositor after an-
other has made a claim is protected if it has waited a reasonable time for
proofs of such claim or for court order. Drumm-Flato Comm. Co. v. Ger-
lack Bank, 92 Mo. App. 326 (1902); Huff v. Oklahoma State Bank, 87
Okla. 7, 207 Pac. 963 (1922).
BROCRS---MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN EXCLUSIVE SALES CONTRAcT.-The
plaintiff real estate agent had a 30-day contract for the exclusive sale of
the defendant's property at a price to net $5700. The defendant sold
RECENT CASE NOTES
through another broker for $6000, whereupon suit was brought for com-
pensation. The claim for the $300 "excess" was stricken from the plaintiff's
bill by the lower court, leaving only allegations as to time and money
spent to find a customer. Held, on appeal, that the ruling be affirmed, on
the ground that the action for commissions would not lie since the plaintiff
had secured no customer "ready, able and willing" to perform. Iscrn v.
Gordon, 273 Pac. 435 (Kan. 1929).
Where the contract fixes no commission and the sale is to be for a net
price, it is generally held that the compensation for procuring a customer
is impliedly any excess over that amount. McKibbcn v. Wilson, 105 Kan.
200, 182 Pac. 638 (1919); Noyes v. Caldwell, 216 Mass. 525, 104 N. E. 495
(1914). Contra: Tick-nor v. Spence, 26 Ga. App. 663, 100 S. E. S09
(1921). Full commission is usually awarded where the broker procures a
customer who enters into a contract with the owner, although the customer
subsequently refuses to perform. Bird -v. Rowell, 180 Mo. App. 421, 167
S. W. 1172 (1914). But where the agreed compensation was an
recovery has been denied in this situation. Yozunginan v. Miller, 210 Mo.
App. 151, 241 S. W. 433 (1922) (on the ground that no sale having been
made, there was no excess). But if, under similar facts, the owner re-
fuses to perform, the agreed compensation is recoverable, although an
"excess" contract. Overton v. Harrison, 207 Ala. 590, 93 So. 564 (1922).
And where a customer was procured, but the owner refused to deal with
him, commissions were awarded. Wallcr -v. Chancey, 117 So. 705 (Fla.
1928). But cf. Williamson v. Sasser, 179 N. C. 497, 103 S. E. 73 (1920).
Where the broker has not procured a customer, but the owner himself sells,
no compensation can be recovered by the broker unless his contract is one
of "exclusive sale." See Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 167, 115 At.
723, 724 (1922). And some jurisdictions deny recovery even in the latter
situation. Roberts v. Har'ington, 168 Wis. 217, 169 N. W. 603 (1918)
("exclusive sale" construed to mean "exclusive agency"); Svnnyside Land
Co. v. Bernier, 119 Wash. 384, 205 Pac. 1041, 20 A. L. R. 1261 (1922). But
where the sale is made through another broker, some compensation is al-
lowed whether an "exclusive sale" or "exclusive agency." Cf. (1927) 6
Am. LAW SCHOOL REV. 111, 112. Recovery may be limited to the reasonable
value of the services rendered, in addition to expenses incurred. William-
son v. Sasser, supra. Or it may include loss of prospective profits. Marn-
ing Star Mining Co. v. Bennett, 164 Ark. 244, 261 S. W. 639 (1924). And
damages measured by the excess have been held to be recoverable. Atlantic
Coast Realty Co. v. Townsend, 124 Va. 490, 98 S. E. 684 (1919); cf. Rob-
ertson's E."r v. Atlantic Coast Realty Co., 129 Va. 494, 106 S. E. 521
(1921) (continuation of same action). Inclusion of prospective profits
has been objected to as being too speculative and subject to collusion. Sea
Millican v. Haynes, 212 Ala. 537, 539, 103 So. 564, 565 (1925). It would
seem preferable, however, to allow such recovery rather than to allow the
owner to profit by his breach by limiting the award to actual costs. See
Schwartz v. Akerlnd, 240 Ill. App. 480, 4S7 (1926). But see SEcwim,
DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 834c.
CAPRXERS-CONTRAcTUAL LI ITATION OF Tim IN WHICH TO STU.--The
British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924, modeled after the Hague
Rules of 1921, provides for a one-year period of limitations to sue carriers
in the event of loss or damage of goods. This act was incorporated in tw:o
bills of lading for carriage of goods from England to New Yorlz, and two
separate suits were brought in the New York state courts more than a
year after the cause of action arose. In one case it was held that the
contractual limitation barred recovery. Sapinbropf v. Cunard Stcawalzzp
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Co., 1929 Am. Mar. Cas. 240 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1928). In the other it
was held that the limitation was contrary to public policy and recovery
was allowed. Greenspon-Newman, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 1929 Am.
Mar. Cas. 11 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. N. Y. 1928).
The presence of a statute of limitations does not prevent an agreement
between carrier and shipper prescribing a shorter period within which suit
against the carrier must be brought. Central Vt. R. R. v. Soper, 59 Fed.
879 (C. C. A. 1st, 1894); 1 MORE, CARuumRs (Zd ed. 1914) 477; 1 WOOD,
LImITATIONS (4th ed. 1916) § 53d. Contra: Express Co. v. Walker, 26 Ky.
L. R. 1025, 83 S. W. 106 (1904). But the validity of such agreements has
been held to depend upon the reasonableness of the period fixed. Missouri,
K. & T. Rvy. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397 (1913) (upholding
ninety-day limitation); Shipping Board v. Texas Star Flour Mills, 12 F.
(2d) 9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (six-month limitation unreasonable where,
because of delay in delivery, shipper had only one month to investigate
and sue). Some states by statute have prohibited such agreements abso-
lutely. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. James, 36 Okla. 196, 128 Pac. 279 (1912) ;
Southern Kansas RV. v. Hughey, 18 S. W. 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
But as to interstate shipments, these local prohibitions are inoperative.
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman, supra. A federal statute provides that
agreements affecting interstate commerce are invalid if the period set is
less than two years after notice of disavowal of the claim by the carrier.
Transportation Act, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20 (11) (1926).
The New York court has held that this two-year minimum period sets a
standard of public policy which will be enforced even in cases involving
shipments outside the scope of the act. South & Cent. Amer. Com. Co. v.
Panama 1? R., 237 N. Y. 287, 142 N. E. 666 (1923) (four-month limitation
held void in shipment from Panama Canal to New York); (1924) 33 YAME
L. J. 790. But the policy of the Transportation Act has been held not to
invalidate a local statute of limitations providing for a maximum period
shorter than two years after notice of disavowal. Louisiana & W. R. R.
v. Gardiner, 273 U. S. 280, 47 Sup. Ct. 386 (1927) (state law barred action
two years after the shipment). Nor has this policy been adopted in the
through export bill of lading provided by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for shipments from inland points to foreign countries, which stipu-
lates a one-year limitation period. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 66 I.
C. C. 687 (1922). It would seem that the latter provision furnishes as
close an analogy to the instant situation as the Transportation Act. Cf.
Cudahy Pkg. Co. v. Munson S. S. Line, 22 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
And the interest in uniformity probably would be better served by upholding
a contractual provision valid under English law and in accord with the
Hague Rules, rather than by invalidating it on the basis of a policy which
is as yet unsettled. Cf. Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553,
27 N. E. 665 (1891).
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MovABLES-THE LAW OF THE SITUS-PUBLIC POLICY.
-The plaintiff delivered a diamond to a firm in New York, giving authority
to sell. Without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff the firm pledged
it with the defendant in New Jersey. In an action of replevin brought in
New Jersey, the trial court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff If
they found that the transaction between the plaintiff and the New York
firm did not constitute a sale. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Held,
on appeal (two judges dissenting), that the judgment be reversed, on the
ground that under the New York Factors' Act, the firm had the power to
make the pledge. Charles T. Dougherty Co., Inc. v. Krimke, 144 At]. 617
(N. J. 1929).
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The modern theory is that the law of the situs should govern the creation
and transfer of interests in tangible chattels. Schmidt v. Pcrkhw, 74 N. J.
L. 785, 67 Atl. 77 (1907), 11 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1007 (1903); GooMnnCr,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 147; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEM1ENT (Am.
L. Inst. 1926) §§ 51, 300, 409. But see STORY, CONFLIcT OF LAyS (3th ed.
1883), §§ 383, 384, 390 for the older doctrine. Nevertheless, where the
chattel has been removed from the original jurisdiction without the kmowl-
edge or consent of the "owner" (including chattel mortgagee, conditional
vendor, lessor, etc.), many cases have applied the law of the original juris-
diction in order to protect such "owner" against third persons if he would
have been protected in the first state. Coopcr v. Philadelphia Worsted Co.,
68 N. J. Eq. 622, 60 At. 352 (1905); Adams v. Fellcrs, 70 S. E. 722 (S. C.
1911), 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385 (1912); Goetschius v. Brightnzan, 245 N. Y.
186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927). Contra: Farmer -v. Evans, 233 S. W. 101 (Tex.
1921). An attempt has been made to generalize from these cases that the
second state has no "jurisdiction" to deprive the owner of his interest in
the property. Beale, Jurisdiction. Over Title of Absent 02encr in a Chattel
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 805; cf. CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am.
L. Inst. 1926) §§ 52, 52 (b) (iv). But this statement can not be said to
rest upon any clear authority. GooDnalH, op. cit. supra § 149; Comment
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 966; cf. (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 827. A more satis-
factory explanation of the cases seems to be that the policy of the two
states is fundamentally the same (in providing some means for protecting
an "owner" out of possession against third persons), and the second state
has deemed it desirable to forego compliance with its local requirements in
order to procure a like dispensation by the first state, if the situation
should be reversed. See Union Secrities Co. 'v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 49,
236 Pac. 513, 514 (1925). But where the policies of the two states are
fundamentally opposed (where the "owner" is provided a means of pro-
tecting himself in one state, but not in the other), the state of the situs has
usually determined the interests of the parties according to its own local
rules. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 87 (1921) (mortgagee's
interest under Colorado mortgage protected against vendor's interest under
conditional sale made in Utah and good there against third persons); Mar-
vin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. L. 410 (1386) (vendor under Pennsyl-
vania conditional sale protected against innocent purchaser in New Jersey,
although in Pennsylvania purchaser would have been protected); Judy v.
Evans, 109 Ill. App. 154 (1903) (attachment for a debt of conditional
vendee of chattel allowed in Illinois although it would not been allowed
against conditional vendor in Indiana where sale was made); MIN oR, CO.,-
FLICT OF LAWS (1901) § 130. Contra: Barrett 'v. Kelley, 06 Vt. 515, 29 Atl.
809 (1894). The policy of New Jersey as to pledges by factors is directly
opposed to that of New York. Toume v. Goldman, 26 N. J. L. J. 47 (1903);
Thompson v. Goldstone, 171 App. Div. 666, 157 N. Y. Supp. G21 (2d Dep't,
1916) ; NEw YORK ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, § 43; 1 W.LIS-
TON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§ 317, 320. Hence, in the instant case, there
would seem to be no reason for departing from the general rule of allow-
ing the law of the situs to govern.
CORPORATIONS-CHANGE OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS--MOTIN FO Ar-
PRAIsAL OF SEAns.-The petitioner owned shares in the defendant corpo-
ration which were preferred as to capital distribution, but not as to divi-
dends. The defendant, with the necessary consent of two-thirds of its
shareholders, had filed an amendment to the certificate of incorporation
retiring the old issues of preferred shares and authorizing the issue of
shares preferred both as to dividends and capital distribution, but limited
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to dividends of seven per cent. Section 38 (11) of the New York Stock
Corporation Law provides that "if the amended certificate alters the prefer-
ential rights of any outstanding shares" any holder of such shares not
voting in favor of the alteration may demand an appraisal and payment of
the value of his shares. Held (three judges dissenting), that the peti-
tioner's motion for an appraisal should be granted. Silbcrkraus W. Schaffer
Stores Co., 250 N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929).
Statutes designed to protect the dissenting shareholders in this situa-
tion exist in only two states. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW (1923) § 38 (11);
OHIO CORP. ACT (1927) §§ 8623-15, 8623-72. In the only other case call-
ing for an interpretation of this type of statute the petitioner based his
claim upon an amendment creating two additional classes of shares to be
preferred over those held by the petitioner both as to dividends and capi-
tal distribution. The petitioner's claim was denied. Dresset v. Donner
Steel Co., 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928) (memorandum opinion;
three judges dissented). The court in the instant case distinguished it
from the Dresser.case on the ground that in the latter the petitioner's pref-
erential rights were unchanged, though perhaps reduced in value, while
in the present case the existing preferential right was extinguished and
new rights substituted. These new rights would probably prove to be more
valuable than the old, but because of the limitation as to dividends this is
uncertain. It is submitted that the purpose of the legislation here involved
must have been to protect the dissenting preferred shareholder whenever a
change in the share structure might reduce the value of his interest in the
corporation. By the decision in the Dresser case this purpose was partially
defeated. See (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1153. Although not willing to repud-
iate this prior holding the court by the decision in the instant case rqstricts
its scope and reaches a result more consonant with the policy embodied in
the statute.
COuRTs-JURIsmcTIoN-DIVORCE ACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN CONSUL.-
The wife of a Roumanian vice-counsel brought a divorce suit in a federal
district court. The action was dismissed on the ground that the federal
courts have no jurisdiction in cases involving domestic relations. Popovici
v. Popovici, 30 F. (2d) 185 (N. D. Ohio 1927). When the same action
was brought in a state court, the consul asked for a writ of prohibition
from the supreme court of the state on the ground that the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction in actions against consuls. Writ denied. State
ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 164 N. E. 524 (Ohio 1928).
Under'the Judicial Code the federal courts are given exclusive jurisdic-
tion in all actions against consuls. 36 STAT. 1160 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §
371 (1926). Federal courts have customarily exercised such jurisdiction
and state courts have declined to take it. Davis v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276
(U. S. 1833); Puente, Amenability of Foreign Consuls to Judicial Process
in the United States (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 447; Note (1922) 35
HARv. L. REV. 752. Contra: State v. De La Foret, 2 Nott. & McC. 217
(S. C. 1820). This exclusive jurisdiction has generally been assumed to
include actions for separation or divorce. Higginson v. Higginson, 96 Misc.
457, 158 N. Y. Supp. 92 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Puente, op. cit. supra at 457;
DOBME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 258. In dismissing the instant suit the
federal court relied on the rule laid down in Barber v. Barber (21 How.
582, 584 (U. S. 1858)] that federal courts will not assume jurisdiction in
cases involving domestic relations. This rule, uniformly applied in cases
involving diversity of citizenship, where the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, cannot be relied on to cover a suit against a consul, where the
Judicial Code denies state jurisdiction. A possible device for avoiding the
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explicit language of the Code, not resorted to by either court, is to say
that this action is not "against" a consul, but merely an action "in 7erm,"
'. e., declaratory of "status." Cf. Kinderlin,. 'Meyer, 2 Miles 242 (Phila.
Dist. Ct. 1838) (action making consul garnishee held to be not "against" a
consul). But such interpretation seems particularly inapplicable here,
where the consul's marital interests are adversely affected. In addition,
without further extension of their powers, state courts are powerless to
enforce alimony decrees against a consul. Cf. Ia re Aycinina, 1 Sandf.
690 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1848). Any such e-xtension of powers, taking from
the control of the federal government cases involving foreign relations,
seems to be undesirable and to defeat the purpose of the Judicial Code.
See Davis v. Packard, supra at 284. The assumption of jurisdiction by
the state court in the instant case, apparently to avoid injustice to the
wife, seem unwarranted, inasmuch as there is no bar to the reopening of
this action in the federal courts. Bunker Hill & Sullivan M. & C. Co. v
Shoshone Mining Co., 109 Fed. 504 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901). The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari. 49 Sup. Ct. 265 (U. S. 1929).
COURTS-ORIGNAL JURISDICTION OF SuPR anm CouRT-Ar CTIONs TO WHICH
A STATE IS A PARTY.-The defendant had been withdrawing on an average
of 8,500 cubic feet of water per second from Lake Michigan for sewage
purposes. The plaintiff state brought suit in the United States Supreme
Court for an injunction restraining the defendant from abstracting such
quantities of water on the ground that its citizens and property owner.
were being damaged by the reduction of levels in the various lakes and
rivers. Held, that the court had jurisdiction and that the cause be referred
to a master to prepare a form of decree. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 49 Sup.
Ct. 163 (U. S. 1929).
The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party. U. S. Co1rs.
Art. III, § 2 (2). Where a question of state property rights or boundaries
is involved, a clear case for such jurisdiction presents itself. South Dakota
v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 24 Sup. Ct. 269 (1904) (action on a
bond); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 403 (1906) (state
boundary). But this jurisdiction does not exist where the suit is brought
under disguise of a state acti6n to enforce claims of individuals. Lodiiana
-v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 251 (1900) (action by plaintiff state to
enjoin enforcement of statute by defendant state having injurious effect on
a group of merchants in plaintiff state); Oklahoima v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry., 220 U. S. 277, 31 Sup. Ct. 434 (1911) (action by state brought for
benefit of shippers to restrain carrier from charging unreasonable rates) ;
Note (1923) 10 VA. L. REV. 147. Between these two extremes fall the
cases wherein the state has been allowed to sue as quasi-sovereign or
parens patriae to preserve the health, comfort and welfare of its inhabit-
ants. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. 552 (1902) (diversion
of water by defendant depriving citizens of plaintiff of supply for irriga-
tion purposes) ; Wyonzing '. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552 (1922)
(violation of riparian rights of citizens of plaintiff state); see Coleman,
The State ag Defendant (1917) 31 HARv. L. REv. 210, 223. The power
to make treaties and declare war having been surrendered to the general
government, it is essential that some remedy should be afforded to the
states for the protection of their citizens. See Rhode Island va. Mas.achu-
setts, 12 Pet. 657, 726 (U. S. 1838); Kansas v,. Colorado, supra at 141, 22
Sup. Ct. at 557. It has been suggested that the court take jurisdiction where
the dispute is one that would normally be the subject of diplomatic adjust-
ment. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 373, 44 Sup. Ct. 133,
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139 (1923). But a state may not institute judicial proceedings as parcn
patriae to protect its citizens from the operation of a statute of the United
States since with respect to their relations to the federal government, the
lattei and not the state represents them as parens patriae. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923). In tha
instant case, the plaintiff is suing not only in its capacity of patrens patriao
but also to protect its own interests in its navigable waters which are
affected by the defendant's activities. By entertaining the instant suit
the court obviates the necessity of a great number of separate suits brought
by individual landowners residing in the plaintiff state. Cf. Missouri V.
Illinois and Chicago District, 180 U. S. 208, 241, 21 Sup. Ct. 331, 344
(1901).
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER--AVAILABILITY OF ACTION TO PLAINTIFF
WHO OBTAINED POSSESSION BY OUSTER OF DEFENDANT.-Tho plaintiff,
claiming title under a sheriff's deed, forcibly took possession of the
defendant's premises in his absence. Nine months later the defendant
returned and forcibly retook possession. The plaintiff brought a statutory
action of forcible entry and detainer to regain possession. The lower
court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be reversed. Benevides v: Lucio, 13 S. W. (2d) 71 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
Upon the theory that statutes of forcible entry and detainer are intended
to prevent breaches of the peace by prompt restoration of possession,
most jurisdictions require of a plaintiff in such an action that he show
merely actual possession and ouster therefrom. Iron Mountain & H. R. R.
v. Johnson, 119 U. S. 608, 7 Sup. Ct. 339 (1887); Sunday v. Moore, 135
Wash. 414, 237 Pac. 1014 (1925). As to what is sufficient possession, see
Note (1911) 21 ANN. CAS. 1126; (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REV. 327. Hence
the defense of a superior right to possession has generally not been allowed.
Casey v. Kitchens, 66 Okla. 169, 168 Pac. 812, L. R. A. 1918B 667 (1917);
Orentlicherman v. Matarese, 99 Conn. 122, 121 Atl. 275 (1923). A minor-
ity of courts, however, consider the criminal action sufficient to prevent
breaches of the peace and, permit the right to possession to be put in
issue in the civil action. Murry v. Buris, 6 Dak. 170, 42 N. W. 25 (1889) ;
Page v. Dwight, 170 Mass. 29, 48 N. E. 850 (1897). The instant court
does not purport to follow this minority view and declines to inquire into
the plaintiff's rights under the sheriff's deed. The result is reached on
the narrower ground that the action should not be available to one who
relies on a possession which was itself obtained through a forcible ouster
of the present defendant. While this view is not entirely unreasonable,
other courts have not adopted it. King's Administrators v. St. Lovis Gas
Light Co., 34 Mo. 34 (1863); Cain v. Flood, 21 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 116, 14
N. Y. Supp. 776 (Common Pleas 1891), aff'd, 138 N. Y. 639, 34 N. E. 512
(1893). And the policy of discouraging breaches of the peace would seem
to be furthered by permitting the action to be employed even by one who
has obtained possession in such a manner, so long as his possession has
become actual and peaceable.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-BULK SALES ACT-DELIVERY OF GOODS
UNDER CHATTEL MORTGAGE AS A "DisPosAL." -A merchant in good faith
mortgaged his stock of goods to the defendant to secure a loan, reserving
for himself the privilege of sale in the ordinary course of business. Seven
months later the merchant defaulted in his payments and surrendered
possession of all the goods to the defendant. The Bulk Sales Law invali-
dates the "sale or disposal" of a stock of merchandise otherwise than in
the ordinary course of business unless the purchaser duly notifies the sel-
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ler's creditors. KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 58, § 101. The plaintiff,
trustee in bankruptcy of the merchant, sought to have the mortgage set
aside for the defendant's failure to comply with the statute. The lower
court gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the delivery
of the goods to the defendant was a "disposal" of them within the statute.
Judgment reversed. Joyce v. Armourdale State Bank, 274 Pac. 200 (Kan.
1929).
A chattel mortgage on merchandise where there is no transfer of pos-
session is generally held not to be within the prohibition of the Bulk Sales
Law. Hannal. & Hogg v. Richtcr Brcwing Co., 149 Mlich. 220, 112 N. M.
713 (1907) (statute invalidated "any sale, transfer, or assignment");
Noble v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Okla. 6G2, 127 Pac. 14 (1911)
("sales, exchanges, and assignments" prohibited). This is also true where
possession is surrendered to the mortgagee. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark.
140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918) ("sale, transfer, or assignment" prohibited);
Fanrers' tCo-op. Co. v. Bank of Lceton, 4 S. W. (2d) 1068 (Mlo. 1928)
("sale, trade, or disposition" prohibited); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirt-
land, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N. W. 151 (1920) ("sale, trade, or other disposi-
tion" prohibited). Contra: Lin County Bank v. Daris, 103 Kan. 672,
175 Pac. 972 (1918); Beene v. National Liqzwr Co., 193 S. W. 596 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1917) ("sale or transfer" prohibited) [but this view of the
Texas statute was rejected in Re Griin Dng Co., 289 Fed. 140 (N. D.
Tex. 1923)]. Nor is a sale under foreclosure of a chattel mortgage within
the statute. Wasserman v. McDonnell, 190 Blass. 326, 7G N. E. 959 (1906)
("sale" prohibited). However, a chattel mortgage, followed immediately
by a release of the equity of redemption amounts to a "sale" within the
statute. Mills v. Sullivan, 222 Mlass. 587, 111 N. E. 605 (1916). And a
chattel mortgage may be held void when there is an apparent intention to
evade the statute. Waldrep v. Exchange State Bank, 81 Okla. 162, 197
Pac. 509 (1921). Furthermore some states have expressly included mort-
gages within the prohibition of the Bulk Sales Law. OxLA. CorP. STAT.
ANN. (1921) § 6030; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Mloses, 1921) § 4370
et seq.; cf. N. Y. LIEN LAW (1923) § 230-a. In the absence of such a
statutory prohibition, some courts have said that the result depends an
whether the mortgagee gets "title" or only a "lien." See Linn County
Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 674, 175 Pac. 972, 973 (1918). But this
distinction is not supported by the cases. Aristo Hosicry Co. v. Ramsbot-
tom, 46 R. I. 505, 129 Atl. 503 (1925) (chattel mortgage not within statute
although "title theory" adopted); Beene -v. Aational Liquor Co., -upra,
(within statute although "lien theory" followed). The instant decision is
rested upon the ground that delivery of possession constitutes a "disposal"
under the local statute. Inasmuch as creditors can easily be defeated by
such transactions, and since good apd bad faith are too indeterminable to
be of utility in reaching a decision, the result seems commendable.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-RECOVERY OF EXPENmTUES BY GRNTzE.-
The plaintiff, a judgment creditor, sued an insolvent debtor and his
daughter to set aside a voluntary conveyance to the daughter as being in
fraud of creditors. A decree was rendered for the defendants in the
lower court. Held, on appeal, that the decree be reversed, but that the
grantee be given a prior lien for sums in excess of receipts expended by
her for maintenance of the property. Marion Automobile Co. v. Broinz,
272 Pac. 914 (Ore. 1928).
The finding of a court as to whether a grantee under a fraudulent con-
veyance acted in "good" or 'bad faith" is frequently made decisive on the
issue of the allowance of his claim for expenditures against the creditors
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of the grantor. Knowledge of the grantor's fraudulent motive destroys
the grantee's privilege to hold the conveyance as security for consideration
paid by him. Sweeney v. Farmer's State Bank of Greenville, 219 Ky. 471,
293 S. W. 959 (1927). The grantee's good faith, however, will protect
him to the extent of the payments made. Butler v. Arnold, 116 Wash.
204, 196 Pac. 582 (1921); London v. Anderson Brass Works, 197 Ala. 16,
72 So. 359 (1916). And so, where the "good faith" grantee was a creditor
of the grantor. Cartan v. Phelps, 89 N. J. Eq. 599, 105 At]. 240 (1918);
cf. Cryer v. Conway, 181 Ky. 526, 205, S. W. 562 (1918). But payments
tq the grantor after notice of the fraud are not protected. Fluegel v.
Hensehel, 7 N. D. 276, 74 N. W. 996 (1898). Likewise a claim for the
value of improvements made subsequent to notice will not be successful.
Walker v. Williamson, 177 Ky. 599, 198 S. W. 10 (1917). But if the credi-
tor seeks an accounting for rents and profits, this claim for improvements
will be allowed despite "bad faith." Rucker v. Abell, 47 Ky. 566 (1848);
King v. Wilcox, 11" Paige 589 (N. Y. 1845). And an innocent grantee can
recover the value of the improvements at the time the conveyance is set
aside. Borden v. Doughty, 42 N. J. Eq. 314 (1886). Expenditureg to
discharge liens for taxes and incumbrances cannot be claimed by a grantee
who has acted in "bad faith." Sheridan o.. McCormick, 39 N. D. 641, 168
N. W. 59 (1918) (taxes and interest); Leinbach v. Dyatt, 117 Kan. 265,
230 Pac. 1074 (1924) (mortgage and taxes). But a grantee, not found
guilty of "bad faith," is entitled to subrogation to the rights of the holders
of the discharged liens. Printz v. Brown, 31 Idaho 443, 174 Pac. 1012
(1918) (mortgage and taxes); cf. Hicks v. Beals, 83 Ore. 82, 163 Pac, 83
(1917). (chattel mortgage paid off by a vendee who violated the Bulk
Sales Law). Those who, in good faith, claim through the grantee are
similarly protected. Bomberger v. Turner, 13 Ohio St. 263 (1862)
(grantee's heir; taxes and improvements); Lilianthal v. Lesser, 102 App.
Div. 500, 92 N. Y. Supp. 619, aff'd, 185 N. Y. 557, 77 N. E. 1190 (1906)
(grantee's executors; mortgage). When an accounting for rents and
profits is sought, the grantee can make a successful claim for discharged
incumbrances whether he has acted in "good faith" or not. Loos v.
Wilkinson, 113 N. Y. 485, 21 N. E. 392 (1889) ("bad faith"; taxes, interest,
repairs, commissions of the rent-collector, but not insurance premiums);
Young v. Ward, 115 I1. 264, 3 N. E. 512 (1885) ("bad faith"; mortgage).
Contra: Strike's Case, 1 Bland 57 (Md. 1826), aff'd, 2 Harr. & G. 191
(1828) ("bad faith"; taxes, street-assessments, ground rent). The nature
of the disbursementg in the instant case was not specified, nor did the
court decide whether the grantee acted in good faith. The instant decision
is well supported, assuming the grantee acted in good faith; and even if
in bad faith, expenditures to the extent that they were for preservation
of the property might well be protected. Cf. Frank v. Von Bayer, 236
N. Y. 473, 141 N. E. 920 (1923).
INFANTS-AOIDANCE OF CONTRACTS-NECESSITY OF RESTORATION OF
CONSIDERATON.-The defendant, an infant of 17, purchased radio parts
from the plaintiff which he assembled into sets and sold. In a suit for
an unpaid balance, the defendant pleaded his infancy. The lower court
gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
reversed. Shutter v. Fudge, 143 Atl. 896 (Conn. 1928).
The general rule that an infant who disaffirms a contract is not required
to account for the consideration he has received but which is no longer
in his possession has frequently been qualified where the infant is suing
for a return of what he has paid. Thus a few states refuse recovery
where the infant cannot make restitution, if the contract was "fair, rea-
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sonable, and provident." Adams v. Bcall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664 (18S7);
Johnson v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 56 Mlinn. 365, 59 N.
W. 992, 26 L. R. A. 187 (1894); cf. Lavoie v. Wooldridge, 79 N. H. 21, 104
Atl. 346 (1918). This seems to be the English view. Steinberg v. Scala
(Leeds) Ltd., 129 L. T. 624 (1923). And some courts allow, the seller
to recoup for deterioration or reasonable use of goods returned. Rice v.
Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899), 47 L. R. A. 303 (1900); Pettit
v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920), 11 A. L. R. 487 (1921). But
where the suit is against the infant, as in the instant case, the courts
seldom require him to account for any of the consideration he has consumed
or squandered. Oneonta Grocery Co. v. Preston, 167 N. Y. Supp. 641 (Sup.
Ct. 1917); McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R. I. 94, 110 Atl. 402 (1920). Such
a rule seems necessary if the defense of infancy is to be of any practical
utility. But -wherever the plaintiff can trace his property into other forms
remaining in the hands of the defendant it is believed that such property
should be recovered. This is often done in equity. Whitman v. Allen, 123
Ale. 1, 121 Atl. 160, 36 A. L. R. 776 (1923) (restoration of a horse infant
had received in exchange for the original automobile); cf. MacGrcal v.
Taylor, 167 U. S. 688, 17 Sup. Ct. 961 (1896) (subrogation to prior liens
paid off with money loaned to the infant); Chandler v. Jones, 172 N. C.
569, 90 S. E. 580 (1916) (same). And similarly a recovery in indebitatus
assumpsit would seem desirable to the extent that the infant is shown to
retain a benefit from the transaction. Hall v,. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354
(1879); see ANsON, CoNTRAcTs (Corbin's ed. 1924) 193. It does not ap-
pear in the instant case whether this element was present.
PRiNcIPAL AND AGENT-AGEN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A CHECK AS PA1-,1ENT
TO HIS PRI crpAL-The plaintiff, as conditional vendor, Eought to replevy
a car from the defendant who had purchased it from Bland, the conditional
vendee. The plaintiff refused to recognize as payment a check, subsequcntly
honored, given his agent by Bland, for the proceeds of which the agent
had not accounted to the plaintiff. The lower court gave judgment for
the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on the
ground that the agent's receipt of a check, later honored, was equivalent
to a payment to his principal. Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Jonc, 272 Pac.
1084 (Cal. 1928).
The payment of a debt, in money, to an agent authorized by the creditor
to receive it discharges the obligation even though the agent does not
account to his principal. Lusby v. Hershey State Banl:, 217 N. W. 459
(Iowa 1928); cf. Hart v. Northwestern Bank, 191 Ill. App. 396 (1915).
And courts have said repeatedly that, unless the agent is expressly
authorized to accept some other form of payment, he is empowered to
accept only money. See Dixon v. Guay, 70 N. H. 161, 162, 46 Atl. 456
(1900); Rotan Grocery Co. v,. Jackson, 153 S. W. 687, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913). Thus an agent's acceptance of chattels does not extinguish the
creditor's claim against the debtor. Woodruff v. Avier. Road Mach. Co.,
23 Ky. L. R. 1551, 65 S. W. 600 (1901); cf. Merchant v. Rogan, 150 S.
W. 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (board). Nor may a debtor discharge his
obligation by setting off against it a debt due him from, the creditor's
agent. Pearson v. Scott, 9 Ch. D. 198 (1878); Parker v. Leech, 76 Neb.
135, 107 N. W. 217 (1906). It has been held repeatedly that the agent's
receipt of a note in payment does not discharge a debt owed his principal.
Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928 (1703); West Pub. Co. v. Corbett, 165
Mo. App. 7, 145 S. W. 868 (1912); see Wilken v. Vosa, 120 Iowa 500, 503,
94 N. W. 1123, 1124 (1903) (principal permitted to repudiate sale after
agent had received a note and certificate of deposit in payment). But cf.
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Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Hackney, 78 Minn. 461, 81 N. W. 322 (1900)
("general" agent may discharge debt owed principal by receiving a noto).
And this is true even though the agent has received payment of the note
in money. Everts v. Lawther, 165 Ill. 487, 46 N. E. 233 (1897) ; of. Rein-
hart Grocery Co. v. Knuckles, 172 Mo. App. 627, 155 S. W. 1105 (1913).
Obviously a debt due the principal is not discharged by his agent's receipt
of a draft or check which is later dishonored. Roberts Shoe Co. v. McKim,
34 Nev. 191, 117 Pac. 13 (1911) (check); Rogers v. Tiedeman, 9 Ga. App.
811, 72 S. E. 285 (1911) (draft). But cf. Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloy,
264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924) (an agent bank, holding a check for
collection, received in payment the drawee's draft, subsequently dishonored,
and the court considered this payment as to secondary parties on the
check). But where an agent receives a draft or check which is cashed in
due course the debt owed to the principal is held to be discharged oven
though the agent fails to account for the proceeds. Gibson v. Ward, 9 Ga.
App. 363, 71 S. E. 506 (1911) (draft); California Stearns Co. v. Tread-
well, 82 Cal. App. 553, 256 Pac. 242 (1927) (check). And courts say that
the payment dates from the time the check is honored. See Pape v. Westa-
cott, [1894] 1 Q. B. 272, 284; Potter v. Sager, 184 App. Div. 327, 329, 171
N. Y. Supp. 438, 439 (4th Dep't 1918); of. Broughton v. Silloway, 114
Mass. 71 (1873) (principal allowed to repudiate sale between time of
agent's receipt of check and its being honored). The instant case follows
the apparent weight of authority and seems to reach a desirable result
in view of the increasing use of checks in place of cash in business trans-
actions; a custom of which courts may well take judicial notice. See
Potter v. Sager, supra at 328, 171 N. Y. Supp. at 439.
REAL PROPERTY-DOWER IN EQUITABLE ESTATES-EECUTORY CONTRACTS
FOR PURCHASE OF LAND.-The plaintiff's husband contracted during cover-
ture to purchase certain lands, the contract being terminable at the option
of the vendor, upon default of the vendee. The vendee died, leaving pay-
ments in default. It does not appear that the vendor exercised his option.
The widow brought a proceeding to enforce her dower rights. Held, that
the interest of the decedent in the lands be sold and that the widow be
endowed from the proceeds. Matter of Kelleher, 133 Misc. 581 (Surr. Ct.
N. Y. 1929).
The common law allowed no dower in an equitable estate. 2 BL. COMA0.
*129 et seq.; D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 387 (1805);l Claiborne V.
Henderson, 3 Hen. & M. 322 (Va. 1809). This rule has been changed by
statute in England and many American jurisdictions. 3 & 4 W. IV,
c. 105 (1833) now superseded by 12 & 13 GEO. V, c. 16, § 148 (1922)
(abolishing dower); 1 SCRIBNER, DOWER (2d ed. 1883) 420 et scq.; 1
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 214. The same result has been
reached in many of the remaining jurisdictions in this country by judicial
construction of statutes not expressly so providing. 1 SCRIBNER, Op. cit.
supra at 414 et seq.; see Lugar v. Lugar, 160 App. Div. 807, 810, 146 N.
Y. Supp. 37, 39 (1st Dep't 1914); of. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1909)
§ 190. The question often arises as to whether a vendee under a contract
for the sale of land who dies before receiving a conveyance has acquired
a sufficient equitable estate to entitle his widow to dower. Where the
payments have been completed, dower is generally granted. Reed V. Whit-
ney, 7 Gray 533 (Mass. 1856); Howell v. Parker, 136 N. C. 373, 48 S. E.
762 (1904). But see Dalton v. Mertz, 197 Mich. 390, 392, 163 N. W. 912,
913 (1917). But where they have not been completed, many courts will
not allow dower, though no default has occurred. Greenbaum v. Austrian,
70 fI1. 591 (1873) ; see Moran v. Catlett, 93 Neb. 158, 161, 139 N. NV. 1041,
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1043 (1913); (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 550. Contra: Church v. Church,
3 Sandf. Ch. 434 (N. Y. 1846); Spazdding v,. Haley, 101 Ark. 296, 142 S.
W. 172 (1911). Where there is a default in payments at the time of the
vendee's death, as in the instant case, most courts would probably deny
dower. Lobdell v. Hayes, 4 Allen 187 (Mlass. 1862). But see Malin v.
Coult, 4 Ind. 535, 536 (1853); Klzutts v,. Klutts, 5 Jones Eq. SO, 81 (N. C.
1859); Williams v. Kinney, 43 Hun 1, 10 (N. Y. 1887); Matter of Boshart,
107 Misc. 697, 701, 177 N. Y. Supp. 567, 571 (Surr. Ct. 1919). It has
been said that to compel the completion of the purchase payments merely
to endow the widow would be to enrich her at the expense of the heirs
and creditors. See Greenbaum z,. Austrian, stpra at 594. The type of
relief provided in the instant case is not open to this objection and seems
equitable to all parties.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES--USE OF COUNTERCLAIM TO OBTAIN JURISDICTIONAL
A~oUNT.-In an action for 3000 brought in a state court by a non-
resident plaintiff, the defendant fied a cross-petition for $5000. The
plaintiff thereupon obtained a removal to the federal court, under the
Judicial Code permitting removal by a non-resident defendant when the
matter in dispute exceeds $3000. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § '71
(1926). The defendant moved to remand. Held, that the motion be denied.
San Antonio Suburban Irrigated Farms ',. Shandy, 29 F. (2d) 579 (D.
Kan. 1928).
Where, in an action brought for less than the jurisdictional amount a
non-resident defendant seeks to remove on the basis of a counterclaim,
removal is generally denied. Bennett ',. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C. C. S. D.
Iowa 1891); Harley va. Firewea's Fztnd 122s. Co., 245 Fed. 471" (W. D.
Wash. 1913). But, cf. Lee v. Continental Ins. Co., 74 Fed. 424 (C. C. D.
Utah 1896) (removal permitted, since state statute barring action on a
counterclaim unless it was presented in the original suit deprived the
defendant of the privilege of bringing the action in a federal court). But
since a counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount represents a
claim which could be brought originally in a federal court, the refusal
to permit removal in such a case will tend to induce a litigant to bring
a separate federal suit instead of filing his counterclaim While the
federal courts may be averse to extending their jurisdiction, it would seem
on the whole undesirable to adopt a rule leading to multiplicity of suits.
But this consideration is not present where, as in the instant case, removal
is sought by a non-resident plaintiff on the basis of the 'defendant's counter-
claim which exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Some courts have permitted
removal in this situation on the theory that the counterclaim makes the nom-
inal plaintiff the actual defendant as to a claim in excess of $3000. Zumr-
brann v. Schwartz, 17 F. (2d) 609 (D. Ind. 1927) ; Pierce v. Desmond, 11 F.
(2d) 327 (D. Blinn. 1926). Other courts have refused to allow removal.
Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Terrell, 13 F. (2d) 266 (W. D. Mo. 1926) (counter-
claim said not to be in its nature an independent suit); Glorcr Machize
Works v. Cooke Jellico Coal Co., 222 Fed. 531 (E. D. Ky. 1915) ("defend-
ant" interpreted as applicable only to titular defendant). But insofar
as a party is denied the opportunity to litigate in a federal court a claim
against him, because of the form in which the claim happens to be brought
up, he would seem to be deprived of a substantial procedural privilege
intended to be given under the Judicial Code.
STATUTE OF FRAuDs-ORAL CONTIL.CT TO BEQUEATH M oY.-The plain-
tiff alleged that the deceased made an oral contract with her to bequeath
to her $6000. The estate consisted both of personalty and realty. In a
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suit for specific performance the lower court denied a recovery. Hold, on
appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground, inter alia, that the
contract was within the statute of frauds as an agreement for the convey-
ance of an interest in land. Ohlendiek v. Schuler, 30 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A.
6th, 1929).
Generally, an oral contract to bequeath the whole or any proportion of
an estate, which consists in part of realty, is held to be within the statute
of frauds. Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 Pac. 862 (1896); Ed-
wards v. Broum, 308 Ill. 350, 139 N. E. 618 (1923). Contra: Stahl v. Steven-
son, 102 Kan. 844, 171 Pac. 1164 (1918). The contract being unenforceable
as to the realty is unenforceable as a whole. Pond v. Shecan, 132 Ill. 312, 23
N. E. 1018 (1890). Contra: Mayfield v. Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713
(1918). But where the contract was to bequeath a specific sum of money,
there are numerous instances of the enforcement of such oral agreements
where the statute of frauds was not raised. Grundt v. Shenk, 222 App. Div.
82, 225 N. Y. Supp. 317 (2d Dep't 1927); Jefferson v. Simpson, 83 W. Va.
274, 98 S. E. 212 (1919). And where the statute has been pleaded, such
agreements have been held to be valid. King's Ev'rs v. Hanna, 48 Ky.
369 (1849); see Appleby v. Noble, 101 Conn. 54, 124 Atl. 717 (1924). As
a matter of statutory interpretation, it seems difficult to construe a contract
to leave a sum of money as a contract to dispose of an interest in land.
The only reason for extending the statute of frauds to this situation would
appear to be to avoid the danger of fraudulent claims against the estate.
But this danger would seem to be sufficiently obviated by the strict require-
ment that claims against the estate be proved definitely and certainly by
documentary evidence or by disinterested witnesses. O'Brien V. Foley, 150
App. Div. 257, 134 N. Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dep't 1912).
TORTS--RESPONSIBILITY OF OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
CO-OWNER-EFFcT op HIGHWAY LAws-One of two joint owners of al
automobile, while driving the car for his own use and without the other's
knowledge, negligently injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant as co-owner, under a statute providing that "every
owner of a motor vehicle" shall be responsible for all damage caused by
its use "with the permission, express or implied, of such owner." N. Y.
CONS. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1928) c. 27, § 282-e. The lower court allowed
recovery. Held, on appeal (one justice dissenting), that the judgment be
reversed. Leppard v. O'Brien, 232 N. Y. Supp. 454 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1929).
The purpose Qf statutes of this type is to impose responsibility for
damage caused by an automobile upon the owner, as the one having control
of its use. In carrying out this purpose, the courts consider as his agents
the members of a car-owner's family and all others who drive his car
with his permission. See Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 394, 155 N. E.
683 (1927); Hawkins v. Ermatinger, 211 Mich. 578, 585, 179 N. W. 249,
251 (1920)- . The general tendency of the courts has been to refuse to
extend the responsibility created by these statutes beyond their strictest
interpretation. Psota v. Long Island R. R., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. 1. 180
(1927) (permission exceeded by inviting passengers against instructions) ;
Rowland v. Spalti, 196 Iowa 208, 194 N. W. 90 (1923) (son detours from
authorized route). But in a few instances a broader interpretation has
been given to cover situations which could scarcely have been within the
definite contemplation of the legislatures. Kelly V. City of Niagara Fals,
131 Misc. 934, 229 N. Y. Supp. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (city-owned police
car); Seleine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389, 206 N. W. 130 (1925) (plaintiff
riding in car as borrower's guest). While the instant case follows the gon-
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eral trend of decisions, it would not have been unreasonable to have found
responsibility within the terms of the statute. Nor would it be illogical
to imply the requisite consent from the fact of joint purchase. See dissent
in instant case, supra, at 458. Moreover, the instant decision seems to
afford opportunity for circumventing the intended statutory enforcement
of the "family car doctrine." Cf. Mittelstadt ,. Kelly, 202 Blich. 524, 163
N. W. 501 (1918) (recovery against father denied under similar statute
where son was co-owner). Thus, by making his entire family joint owners
of his automobile, a father might entirely evade the responsibility which
the legislature unquestionably aimed to impose on him as the keeper of a
"dangerous instrumentality." See Bowernan v,. Sheehan, 242 Blich. 95,
103, 219 N. W. 69, 71 (1928).
WILLS-PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN BISN0feER OF LEG.%T .- The testa-
tor made bequests to Arlene Dwyer, daughter of James Dwyer, and to
William Cronin in trust for his son Daniel. James Dwyer's daughter was
named Helene. William Cronin had no son named Daniel, but had one
named William. The testator had known William Cronin and James Dwyer
for many years, was the godfather of the children in question, and usually
called William Cronin's son "Danny." The executor brought a bill in
equity to obtain the construction of the will. Held, that the misnomer
of the legatees could be explained by extrinsic evidence. Farrell v. Sulli-
van, 144 AtI. 155 (R. I. 1929).
The early view of the courts was that a will should be construed liter-
ally and without resort to extrinsic evidence. 5 WIGITOnE, EviDENcE (2d
ed. 1923) §§ 2461, 2470. This view was later expanded so as to permit
evidence of surrounding circumstances, except where the meaning of the
-words was clear on their face. S. Lu e's Home v. Ass'n for Indigent
Females, 52 N. Y. 191 (1873); 5 WIG 0RE, op. cit. supra § 2461. But even
this limitation, known as the rule against disturbing a plain meaning, is
losing ground. 5 WIGmOmE, op. cit. svpra, § 2462. Thus, such evidence is
admitted where there is a devise by a description correct in some respects
and erroneous in others-faka demonstratio non mwcet. Patch -V. White,
117 U. S. 210, 6 Sup. Ct. 617 (1886). In such case, the erroneous descrip-
tion is ignored, but the remainder must be definite and certain. 5 WiG-
mona, op. cit. supra §§ 2473, 2476. If the latter is uncertain, it cannot be
made definite by implying terms of certainty into the will. Note (1920)
15 ILm. L. REv. 99. Evidence of surrounding facts is also admissible to
identify an erroneously named legatee, as in the instant case. In 7e
Stuart's Estate, 184 Iowa 165, 168 N. W. 779 (1918); Wood v. Hammond,
16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324 (1889); 1 PAGE, WiLLS (2d ed. 1926).§ 916; (1921)
19 AlicH. L. REv. 668. It is likewise admissible to show the existence of
a latent ambiguity, and most courts allow it to e.xplain such ambiguity.
Winfield v. Saunders, 142 AtI. 907 (N. J. 1928); cf. Patch v. White,
supra; (1925) 24 MIcu. L. REv. 84. But such evidence is inadmissible to
explain a patent ambiguity. McKee v. CoUinson, 292 Ill. 458, 127 N. E. 92
(1920). However, evidence of declarations of the testator's intintion, as
a means of interpreting the will, is refused in all cases except those of
latent ambiguities. Day v. Webler, 93 Conn. 308, 105 At. 618 (1919); 2
PAGE, op. cit. svpra § 1420. The courts are divided as to whether it is
necessary for the external objects precisely to fit the description in the
document in order that a latent ambiguity exist. 5 WIGIORn, op. cit. cupra
§ 2472. The instant case admits evidence of surrounding circumstances,
but does not discuss evidence of declarations of the testator's intention as
no question of latent ambiguity is involved.
